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Carbon Credit Schemes: Costly Revenue Raisers Whose Benefits Are Questionable

1 day ago
5 min read

Opinion Piece

California’s Cap-and-Trade program (now Cap-and-Invest) and Europe’s Emissions Trading System are presented as efficient market tools that cut emissions while funding the clean transition. In practice, they raise the cost of energy and industrial activity in ways that function much like a targeted tax. The resulting revenue supports a mix of climate-related and progressive priorities; the proponents argue that the emissions benefits are real in some covered sectors, but detractors also believe that any benefits are frequently overstated in scale and clean attribution; and the economic side effects—including pressure on California’s refining sector and broader industrial competitiveness in Europe—are concrete.


Revenue First, Climate Second

These systems require covered emitters to hold allowances. Auctions generate substantial public revenue. In California, Cap-and-Invest has raised tens of billions of dollars that flow into the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund. Continuous and statutory appropriations have directed large shares toward high-speed rail (which has been an unmitigated disaster), the Affordable Housing and Sustainable Communities Program, transit capital and operations programs, forest resilience, drinking-water projects, and other efforts. A significant portion is earmarked for “priority populations", which doesn't include Shasta County or much of the North State. To placate ratepayers, a small portion of the proceeds returns to utility customers as bill credits.

Not every dollar is unrelated to emissions or energy. Forests, efficiency, and certain clean-transport investments have a clearer climate rationale. Yet the overall pattern is a dedicated funding stream shaped by the priorities of the governments that designed it. High-speed rail and equity-focused housing and transit programs are not neutral technical measures; they are longstanding progressive priorities now underwritten by carbon-allowance auctions.


European systems operate on a similar model: member-state revenues are required (and increasingly so) to support renewables, efficiency, clean transport, industrial decarbonization, and “just transition” measures. The political direction of the money is a core feature, not an accident.


Benefits Exist in Places but Are Often Overstated

Covered-sector emissions have declined under the major compliance systems. Multiple peer-reviewed studies of the EU Emissions Trading System find causal reductions relative to counterfactuals, especially in the power sector and more clearly after later reforms that tightened the cap and expanded auctioning. Magnitudes vary by period, sector, and method, but the literature does not support a claim of zero effect. California’s statewide greenhouse-gas emissions have also fallen while the economy grew.


Clean attribution is another matter. In California, the Legislative Analyst’s Office and others have noted that Cap-and-Trade’s specific contribution is hard to isolate because it operates alongside renewables portfolio standards, the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, vehicle rules, efficiency measures, and broader economic shifts. The program is structured as a declining-cap backstop. That design makes it difficult to credit the market alone for the reductions that occurred. Free allocation of allowances in the EU system for years diluted incentives for industry, produced windfall profits in some cases, and left industrial emissions declining more slowly than power-sector emissions.


Voluntary offset markets (forestry, avoided-deforestation, and similar project-based credits) are a weaker category altogether. Investigations and reviews have repeatedly found large shares of credits suffering from non-additionality, over-crediting, leakage, and permanence problems. Those flaws do not automatically indict every compliance system, but they illustrate how easily carbon-credit claims can outrun evidence.


Global impact remains limited. Europe and California are not the majority of world emissions. When production or refining capacity simply relocates, the local reduction can be offset elsewhere. Claims that these schemes have delivered clear, cost-effective climate benefits therefore routinely blend partial evidence with optimistic assumptions about attribution, leakage, and overall value relative to the costs imposed on energy users.


Critics argue that the negligible local benefits are more than offset by carbon gains in countries such as China and India. The economics also do not hold up, as reduced competitiveness in Europe and California is driven by the cost impact of these Cap and Trade systems. This results in market share losses to countries such as China and India.


Adverse Impacts on European Industry

Green regulations, including the EU Emissions Trading System and the broader energy transition, are adding measurable costs to energy-intensive sectors already facing high power prices, global competition, and other burdens. Steel producers have warned that the current ETS trajectory could raise production costs by roughly 50 percent by the early 2030s, risking a sharp drop in manufacturing activity and pressure on millions of jobs across value chains. Major chemical companies have reported more than 20 site closures since 2023, tens of thousands of jobs lost, and collapsing investment; industry leaders have called for urgent ETS reform to prevent further exits, with some describing the sector’s future in Europe as at serious risk without changes.


Groups of large industrial firms in steel, chemicals, cement, and related sectors have publicly urged the European Commission to ensure competitive electricity, protect against imports, and create conditions that make low-carbon production viable rather than simply more expensive. In some analyses, energy prices for European energy-intensive industry remain two to three times higher than those of key competitors. Plant closures and output declines in these sectors have occurred alongside the carbon price and the phase-down of free allowances. Emissions reductions in parts of European manufacturing have coincided with capacity loss, not only efficiency gains.


These pressures are multi-causal. The loss of cheap Russian pipeline gas, higher renewable integration costs, labor and tax burdens, and Chinese overcapacity all matter. Carbon pricing and related green rules form part of the cost stack that has prompted industry warnings, political acknowledgments of deindustrialization risks, and Commission responses—including steel and chemicals action plans, a Clean Industrial Deal, and proposals to slow the ETS cap reduction and extend free allocation. The pattern mirrors California’s experience: local emissions accounting can improve while production and jobs shift or shrink.


Refinery Capacity Loss in California: One Visible Cost Among Many

California has lost substantial refining capacity. Phillips 66 closed its Wilmington refinery in late 2025; Valero shut its Benicia facility in spring 2026. Together, the two plants represented a meaningful share of in-state capacity, contributing to a larger multi-year decline and greater reliance on imported refined products. California gasoline already carries a large premium from taxes, unique fuel specifications, the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, and carbon-compliance costs. Tighter local supply has added volatility.


Virtually all petroleum companies operating in California have pointed to the high cost of regulations, including carbon pricing as a major contributor to their reducing operations within the state. California’s refining environment has long featured high operating costs, specialized fuel requirements, other environmental rules, aging plants, and policy signals of long-term phase-down. Industry analyses and refiners have described the cumulative burden—including Cap-and-Trade compliance costs stacked with the Low Carbon Fuel Standard—as making continued operation of some facilities uneconomic. Policymakers treated the carbon cost as material enough to respond: recent Cap-and-Invest revisions expanded free allowances and created a Manufacturing Decarbonization Incentive pool aimed at reducing exit pressure and easing effects on gasoline prices. That adjustment shows carbon compliance costs were viewed as a contributing factor, not proof they were the dominant one.


The practical results are higher and more volatile fuel prices for drivers and greater dependence on imports. Imports can raise lifecycle emissions through transportation and shift activity to other jurisdictions—classic leakage. The carbon-pricing system did not act alone, but it formed part of the regulatory cost stack that accelerated capacity loss while California continued to consume large volumes of fuel.


A Pattern of Costs and Contested Benefits

Policymakers can continue describing these schemes as efficient climate policy. The record shows revenue-raising mechanisms with partial emissions gains that are hard to isolate cleanly, proceeds that fund a blend of climate and progressive priorities, and measurable side effects on energy infrastructure, industrial competitiveness, and prices. The adverse side effect is the flight of critical industries fleeing to places with a lower cost structure. This is paid for in job losses and economic stagnation.

Northern California drivers see the difference at the pump; European manufacturers are documenting it in plant shutdowns, and in both cases, the citizen taxpayer is left holding the bag.

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